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In all European Union (EU) states, national security is delivered by the various national
armed forces, police services – and by intelligence-led security agencies. Here, the focus
is on the consequences for British and European intelligence agencies of the Brexit
referendum of 23 June 2016.
During thebitter campaign, both ‘Remainers’ and ‘Brexiters’ explicitly citednational security
10risks as key reasons for voting for the one, or other side. For Remain, the then prime minister
David Cameron’s dogged insistence that Britain would be safer in the EU,

from both the threat
of war and terrorism, was ferociously countered by claims made by leading Brexiters (rein-
forced by Sir Richard Dearlove, chief [‘C’] of Britain’s SIS, from 1999–2004) that wewould in fact
be far safer out of the EU.
15Now that Britain has voted clearly to leave the EU, it must be right to reﬂect on what
this will mean for our national security and, of course, for the British and non-British
agencies charged with delivering it.
It goes without saying that in today’s globalised security threat environment, sharing
intelligence must make more sense than ever. The question is not so much ‘why’ but
20‘how’ this should be conducted. Intelligence sharing has a long history, particularly, of








. It was forged in the dark days of the Second World
War and ﬂourished thanks to the UK intelligence successes produced at Bletchley Park.1
Britain’s special intelligence and security relationship with the US was left unaﬀected by
our subsequent EU membership (the UK has close intelligence relationships with other
25EU states, in particular Germany and more recently Poland).
However, intelligence sharing in Europe, which has prospered over the past

10 years, has
always been seen in a diﬀerent, less positive light and at no timemore so than today. This is in
part because EUmembershiphas involved sharing sovereignty, implying its diminutionor loss.
In an important sense, intelligence agencies symbolise national sovereignty

, and certainly prior
30to the London attacks of July 2005, UK agencies were ultra-cautious about working together
on an EU rather than a bilateral basis. Oddly, the ‘Five Eyes’ intelligence sharing arrangements
have never been seen as an erosion of national sovereignty; the same is true for the UK’s
support for NATO where Article Five of the Treaty represents a clear loss of sovereignty.
The growing hostility to Europe in the UK has in recent times made the very word
35toxic in some quarters. The idea that MI6, MI5 and GCHQ would work within the EU with
CONTACT Anthony Glees anthony.glees@buckingham.ac.uk
1https://www.nsa.gov/news-features/declassiﬁed-documents/cryptologic-spectrum/assets/ﬁles/origin_us_british.pdf;
https://www.bletchleypark.org.uk/news/v.rhtm/GCHQ_and_NSA_Directors_meet_at_Bletchley_Park-923142.html.
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smaller or poorer agencies was simple to scorn even though they may have speciﬁc
strengths. For example, both Italy and Austria in particular are well known for their
Human Intelligence

capacity in the Balkans and Arab North Africa.
Intelligence sharing and Brexit
40Britain’s agencies are not only some of the best in the world (and therefore fundamental
to the security of Europe as a whole) but are sustained by laws which allow them to go
well beyond what is permitted in other EU nations. This means that British intelligence
can provide, legally, capabilities denied to its allies and partners.
There are two distinct but connected strands woven into an assessment of how Brexit
45will impact on all EU states’ secret agencies: a high policy one and the day-to-day
functioning of intelligence-led activity on the ground.
It is important to note that the Lisbon Treaty states clearly (at 4(2) TEU) that ‘in
particular national security remains the sole responsibility for the member state’ and
that the EU has no direct competence in this area.2 It follows that in theory EU member-
50ship should make no diﬀerence to any individual nation’s ability to deliver security to its
own citizens and no diﬀerence to whether it would wish to work together on a bilateral
or multilateral basis with other states.
In practice, however, the member states of the EU have opted to cooperate, exploit-
ing the facility possessed by the EU to facilitate this through practice-oriented institu-
55tional arrangements that are capable of enhancing the intelligence reach of all member
states, not least in respect of resource-intensive ones such as satellite technology.
As we shall see, the sharing of intelligence to keep European states as safe as possible
has become so vital that it could be argued (and is argued here) that Brexit or no Brexit,
it has to be in the interests of the UK and the EU27 that it should continue. However, if
60this does not happen, it will be the removal of the UK from these practical ways of
sharing intelligence that will have the biggest impact both on Britain’s security and
intelligence agencies and on those of the EU27.
Indeed so serious are the consequences of Britain’s departure from them that it is
now a key part of Prime Minister Theresa May’s Brexit negotiating strategy to explicitly
65oﬀer a continuation of this cooperation, implicitly, one imagines, in return for conces-
sions on access to the Single Market (something that may be diﬃcult to achieve).
How important, then, is the EU for the eﬀective delivery of security in the
EU as a whole?
As early as 2004 Sir Stephen Lander, a former head of MI5 and of the Serious Organised
70Crime Agency

, wrote that EU intelligence sharing was ‘an idea whose time has come’,
suggesting this be written into the next EU treaty (a suggestion not taken up).3 During
the referendum campaign, the fault lines became clear. For Brexiters, there was nothing
2https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ﬁle/228848/7310.pdf. See also A. Glees,
“European Security Intelligence,” in, The Sage Handbook on European Foreign Policy, ed. E. Drieskens (Washington,
London, Los Angeles: Sage, 2015), 264–

77.
3S. Lander, “International Intelligence Cooperation: An Inside Perspective

,” Cambridge Review of International Aﬀairs

17,




to be gained from cooperation. Indeed by implication, it was argued by Brexiters that
secret agencies were themselves keen to quit the EU.
75One of the most important contributions to the debate was made by Sir Richard
Dearlove who wrote on 29 March 2016 that Brexit would bring ‘two potentially impor-
tant security gains: the ability to dump the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR) and greater control over immigration from the EU’.4 He pointed out that the UK
was ‘Europe’s leader in intelligence and security matters, [giving] much more than it gets
80in return’, dismissing continental intelligence agencies as ‘the leakiest ships of state’. He
attacked the European Arrest Warrant (‘few would note its passing’).
He was the only senior UK intelligence ﬁgure to support Brexit (other chiefs favoured
Remain) and the pro-Brexit media and politicians seized upon his expert view. The
libertarian MP David Davis insisted that the Schengen Accord meant that Britain (not a
85member) could nevertheless not stop EU jihadists from entering the UK. Boris Johnson
claimed ‘the European Court of Justice was militating against our ability to control our
borders and maintain proper surveillance’. Penny Mordaunt MP suggested (bizarrely)
that due to the EU ‘we can’t share the intelligence we need to keep us safe’. The former
Tory leader Michael Howard added ‘the EU is a failing project that is failing to keep its
90people safe’ and Schengen ‘akin to a sign welcoming terrorists to Europe’.
Yet against these views, Remain could ﬁeld the then Home Secretary, Theresa May.
She wrote (on 25 April 2016) that ‘my judgement as home secretary is that remaining a
member of the EU means that we shall all be more secure from crime and terrorism’.5
Her case relied on a detailed analysis: she believed that in or out the UK should leave the
95ECHR (a point to which we must return) as ‘it makes us less secure’ and that outside the
EU ‘we would still have ‘a relationship with the USA, still be part of the Five Eyes, the
closest intelligence sharing relationship in the world’, and would still have ‘our ﬁrst rate
security and intelligence services; we would still share them with our European allies and
they would do the same with us’.
100But, she concluded, that did ‘not mean we would be as safe as if we remain’. Outside
the EU we would have no access to the European Arrest Warrant (this had allowed the UK
to extradite 5

000 people since 2011 and bring 675 suspects or convicts to the UK). She
listed the Passenger Name Records Directive, the Records Information System and the
joint intelligence teams’AQ5 as being considerable advantages to the UK. And her conclusion
105was an important one: ‘these are all agreements that enable law enforcement agencies to
cooperate and share information in the ﬁght against cross border crime’.
The evidence suggests that for the intelligence and security agencies of the EU28, the
most important aspect of the EU has rested on the facilitation of day-to-day working
relationships to promote eﬀective security activity. The signiﬁcance of bilateral intelli-
110gence and security relationships in delivering security to both nations involved needs no
emphasis here. All Western embassies have on their staﬀ intelligence oﬃcers whose
duties are primarily to facilitate eﬀective and cordial relationships between their own
countries agencies and those of their hosts. Brexit will not necessarily aﬀect these
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115popular in Europe since 23 June 2016 and tough negotiations may undermine working
relationships. Where states are very strongly supportive of the idea of the EU, such as
Germany, or where they value the ECHR which the UK may ditch, cooperating with them
becomes much harder, even impossible where human rights issues are concerned.
Where things seem set to become particularly fraught is at the integrated EU level.
120The very existence of the EU and its emphasis on supporting meaningful cooperation
has led to the development of intelligence-sharing institutions within it. The sharing of
strategic intelligence-based assessments within the EU framework is now widely seen by
agencies as being of mutual beneﬁt even by UK agencies, who have most to oﬀer: it is
said that some 40–50

% of all shared intelligence that is fed into the EU’s most important
125assessments comes from UK agencies.
Strategic assessments are currently shared between the EU28 within INTCEN in
Brussels, which has a staﬀ of 100 oﬃcers in four divisions recruited from all EU states.
Fifty-ﬁve percent

of personnel, 35 oﬃcers, work in the analysis division. It adopts an ‘all
sources’ approach, exploiting both secret intelligence-driven analysis from member
130states and its own open source work (it also receives information from the EU Satellite
Centre). Its Situation Room monitors events on a 24/7 basis. INTCEN, it must be
emphasised, ‘expects all its members to be EU citizens’.
In the summer of 2016, EU states established the ‘Counter-Terrorist Group’ based in
The Hague alongside EUROPOL. This is composed of domestic intelligence-led security
135agencies’ personnel from all 28 EU states but including Norway and Switzerland (who
are not part of INTCEN but were required to request permission to join). They aim at the
rapid exchange of information.
That these are no insigniﬁcant matters can be seen by looking at what the UK prime
minister has said about the need to construct a security ‘shield’ for all European states. In
140her deﬁnitive speech in Lancaster House on 17 January 2017

, Ms May made it very clear
that a willingness to exploit Britain’s intelligence power, and to support intelligence-led
security policy, would lie at the core of her new Brexit oﬀer to the EU27. She made
several references to intelligence as a bargaining chip, including two speciﬁcally to
Britain’s intelligence community and its uniqueness in Europe, repeating the point as
145if it were hard to grasp to embarrassing levels.
These were ideas that Ms May had set out before, in far less detail, in her speech to
her Party’s Conference in October where she stated that she wished an ‘agreement [with
the EU27] to include cooperation in law enforcement and counter-terrorism’.6 Insisting
that ‘it remains overwhelmingly and compellingly in Britain’s national interest that the
150EU should succeed’ she outlined how she believed the UK could become ‘the best friend
and neighbor to our European partners’. In addition to trading with them ‘as freely as
possible’ she wished everyone to ‘work with one another to make sure we are all safer,
more secure ….’
She added that Europe faced a serious threat from our enemies and promised ‘that
155Britain’s unique intelligence capabilities will continue to help to keep people in Europe





continent secure. A Global Britain will continue to cooperate with its European partners
in important areas such as crime, terrorism and foreign aﬀairs. All of us in Europe face
the challenge of cross-border crimes, a deadly terrorist threat and the dangers presented
160by hostile states’. Indeed, she said, after Brexit we would wish to ‘work together more …
I want our future relationship with the EU to include practical arrangements on matters





ur intelligence capabilities – unique in Europe – have already saved
countless lives in very many terrorist plots that have been thwarted in countries across
165our continent. After Brexit Britain wants to be a good friend and neighbor in every way
and that includes defending the safety and security of all of our citizens’.
Britain’s oﬀer to the EU27 was, then, that in return for a bespoke arrangement on the
Single Market and the Customs Union, a ‘Brexited Britain’ would continue to oﬀer them
the intelligence and security expertise to keep them safe.
170The signiﬁcance of security issues in the Brexit negotiations and for post-Brexit Britain
with the EU 27 has recently been explored by Malcolm Chalmers, one of the UK’s most
distinguished security policy experts.7 But whilst he oﬀers many fascinating insights, he
fails completely to explain that the delivery of security relies in part on the work of
intelligence and security agencies. Indeed, apart from stating that the UK is ‘the leading
175West European military and intelligence power’, he does not mention intelligence at all.
What Chalmers speciﬁcally cautions against is the UK attempting to trade security
provision to the EU27 in return for economic concessions (precisely what Ms May
appears to want to do).
What Brexit will mean for day-to-day intelligence activity
180Brexit will mean that the UK will be required to leave INTCEN, the Open Source (OSINT)
Division, the EU Situation Room, and the Consular Crisis Management Division as well as
the Counter-Terrorist Group. The UK will also have to quit EUROPOL.8 It will no longer
participate in the Common Security and Defence policy, the Political and Security
Committee, the EU Satellite Centre (SATCEN), Galileo, as well as a host of Open Source
185(OSINT) research groups (for example, the Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity).
Leaving EUROPOL would have an immediate and profound impact according to one
senior police intelligence commander.9 Extradition which used to take months or even
longer, now takes days. If the UK no longer abides by the ECHR, it may well ﬁnd that
EU27 states will refuse to extradite to it (indeed to remove from English law the
190European Charter could well cause major internal issues for UK intelligence oﬃcers
who are deeply concerned that their work should be lawful, a point stressed by
Andrew Parker the chief of MI5 who told Parliament in 2013 that if he asked his oﬃcers
to break the law they would leave the building).10 EU27 oﬃcers will share their concerns.
Precisely because sharing intelligence and encouraging national agencies to work
195together within the EU makes such good sense, it is not surprising that the high policy
of the Brexit government of Theresa May is to seek to continue sharing intelligence and
7https://rusi.org/sites/default/ﬁles/201701_bp_uk_foreign_and_security_policy_after_brexit.pdf.
8Whitehall, 25 February 2016; 5 May 2016; INTCEN, Whitehall, 28 July 2016.
9Private police brieﬁng, 9 February 2017.
10http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2489957/Britains-spy-chiefs-grilled-MPs-television-time.html.
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jointly working to deliver intelligence-led security. Bilateral intelligence-sharing will
continue (currently the UK gains much from working with French and Dutch agencies).
As far as the EU is concerned, it seems hard to doubt that, after Brexit, British intelligence
200agencies will be found knocking on the doors of some EU agencies such as EUROPOL to
request admission, and that even if entry is permitted it will only be to associate status.
It is hard to see how British agencies will feel comfortable in a secondary position and
the evolving close and eﬃcient relationships of the past decade will have been dis-
rupted, perhaps seriously. It must be obvious that the risk to our national security will be
205increased as a result.11
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